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Abstract 
Purpose ​– The purpose of this work is to test several incentive strategies for attaining new 
customers via electronic referrals, or e-referrals. The paper aims to examine: the roles of both 
the magnitude of the incentive offered to the sender and the magnitude of the incentive offered 
to the receiver; and the effect of equity versus inequity of financial incentives for the two parties. 
Design/methodology/approach​ – The study consisted of a large-scale field experiment 
conducted with 45,000 members of an online mall. The participants were divided into eight 
conditions in an incomplete two-factor 4 x 4 between-subjects design, where not every 
combination of incentive magnitudes was utilized and the magnitude of the incentive offered the 
receiver and sender varied in size such that sometimes rewards were equal, sometimes 
receivers of the e-referral had larger rewards, and sometimes senders of the e-referrals 
received more. Dependent measures included the number of e-referrals sent, the number of 
those e-referrals that lead to a new customer registering, and the number of new registrants that 
converted to buyers from completing a purchase. 
Findings ​– The results demonstrate that both the magnitude of financial incentives, and the 
relative magnitude of the incentives for the senders and receivers both influence e-referral rates. 
Specifically, it was found that offering higher incentives to senders and receivers led to an 
increase in referral invitations sent, new member sign-ups and new buyers. It was also found 
that the disparity between incentives offered to senders and receivers affected e-referral rates 
and that inequity should favor the sender to enhance results. 
Originality/value​ – This paper offers marketers valuable insights as to how different 
combinations of financial incentives to receivers and senders can affect e-referral rates. The 
findings suggest that potential referrers respond not only to referral incentives but also to the 
disparity between their incentives and the receivers’ incentives. 
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Introduction 
The trend toward consumers generating their own forms of marketing communication is 
increasingly taking the power of attracting customers out of the hands of the marketers. In a 
struggle to hold on to existing customers, as well as maximize new customer acquisition, 
marketers find themselves challenged with how to best apply new technologies to customer 
acquisition and retention. This paper focuses on how existing customers can be used as a tool 
for increasing the acquisition of new customers with the aid of financial rewards for successful 
ereferrals.  
One of the oldest forms of communication that can lead to customer acquisition is word of 
mouth (WOM) marketing. Technological innovations have given marketers many new tools to 
harness electronic WOM for customer acquisition in the form of ereferrals. Overall referrals take 
many forms in both offline and online environments. Offline referrals can be described as one 
consumer’s promotion of a product or service in offline environments such as in person or by 
telephone. ereferrals are those referrals that occur online. This study introduces the term 
ereferrals to describe these online referrals.  
Ereferrals can be prompted independently by an individual or by company encouragement. 
Individuals initiate and then generate ereferrals through direct e-mails, instant messages, blogs, 
message boards, and social networking sites. Companies may prompt ereferrals through both 
inbound and outbound mechanisms. Inbound mechanisms for ereferrals include such tactics as 
hosting a “tell-a-friend” option on a company webpage, or encouraging online product ratings, 
and hoping they will be positive. Company-prompted outbound ereferral mechanisms include 
suggesting the consumer proactively pass on information about the company’s product or 
service via direct e-mails or some other form of online communication. Often, this form is 
accompanied by a financial reward. Yet the size and nature of the rewards vary tremendously.  
Harnessing the power of the internet in new forms, such as ereferrals, is of interest to marketers 
because it is a potentially low-cost customer acquisition strategy that offers the opportunity to 
recruit high-quality new customers. Compared to traditional advertising and internet advertising, 
including keyword buys and display ads, ereferrals are likely to be seen as more credible by 
consumers who receive them.  
 
Important questions for marketers considering an ereferral program include whether to include 
an incentive, the optimal magnitude of the incentive, and whether to use e-mail prompts to the 
current customer base to generate ereferrals to potential new customers. Another critical 
question is whether to give an incentive to the sender (the current customer of the company) or 
the receiver (the sender’s contact and thus the potential new customer of the company) or both.  
There is significant variance around the world in how incentive plans are structured in terms of 
both who gets them, and how much is offered. For example, in the US telecommunications 
industry, Verizon offers a “chance to win” reward for referring friends ( July 2011), Sprint offers 
nothing (as of July 2011, yet had referral programs in past years offering $25 to both parties for 
a successful referral) and AT&T offers $25 only for the referring party ( July 2011). In Germany, 
wireless provider O2 allows a choice of referral incentives of either fifty Euros in cash to the 
referrer or 24 months of unlimited talking time to both parties (October 2011). Incentive 
magnitudes to the two parties (sender and receiver) in an ereferral situation can also vary within 
industries. Companies in the same country and same industry can offer very different 
incentives. For example, leading online US photo services Snapfish and Shutterfly both offer 
free prints as incentives for successfully referring new clients, but Snapfish offers 20 free prints 
to just the sender ( July 2011) while Shutterfly has offered 30 free prints to the sender and 15 
free prints to the receiver ( June 2010).  
Social networking sites often make an effort to encourage ereferrals when new members 
register. Upon registration on social networking sites such as LinkedIn, Facebook, Hi5, or 
Google+, members are requested to link to others using their e-mail address book. This 
encouragement often continues each time the member logs in. In these cases, the person who 
is referred receives an e-mail message referencing the connection and encouraging this 
nonmember to become a member. This, in essence, creates an ereferral. 
The ereferral examples from these well-known companies depict the wide usage of ereferrals as 
well as the diversity of incentives and tactics employed. While many companies still offer no 
incentives for ereferrals, this could be due to lack of certainty regarding what magnitude would 
work best and to whom to offer the incentive. This research attempts to help answer some of 
the questions by testing different combinations of financial incentive magnitudes to senders and 
receivers of ereferrals. More specifically, the research presented here examines the 
effectiveness of differing magnitudes of monetary incentives for senders and receivers of 
ereferrals, at both equal and unequal incentive magnitudes. 
This ereferral research will thus be presented within the framework of the wide-ranging literature 
on word-of-mouth communications, the less extensive work on ereferrals, and finally how equity 
theory can provide insights into these ereferrals.  
 
Prior research on WOM marketing  
Companies covet positive WOM marketing as a tool to influence their customers for two main 
reasons. First, WOM through a friend or acquaintance is considered to carry more credibility 
than an advertisement or promotion from the company itself (Day, 1971). Smith and Swinyard 
(1982) created a model investigating the effects of advertising compared to direct product 
experience and found that the latter is more credible. Thus when a person with direct 
experience influences others through WOM, it is likely to be more credible than advertising. 
Second, WOM does not usually require the extensive media expenditures typically needed for 
advertising. Underpinning the importance of WOM is the declining role that advertising plays in 
influencing consumer decisions (Godes ​et al​., 2005). Today, consumers around the world are 
inundated with advertising messages, and this inundation has likely contributed to this decline in 
advertising effectiveness. 
WOM is often associated with firm-anointed characteristics, such as customer satisfaction, 
loyalty, retention and trust. Most researchers agree that the element of customer satisfaction is 
an antecedent to WOM (Anderson, 1998; Dichter, 1966; Sundaram ​et al.​, 1998) and that in 
cases of extreme customer satisfaction WOM occurs more frequently (Anderson, 1998). 
However, the researchers do not always agree on the role played by customer satisfaction. 
Some research categorizes customer satisfaction as a necessary component of WOM and the 
primary reason for the initiation of WOM. Other research shows the presence of customer 
satisfaction as necessary but not sufficient in itself. They believe that satisfaction is needed, but 
is not itself the catalyst for the WOM recommendation (Arnett ​et al.​, 2003). 
Online word-of-mouth marketing taps into the trend of consumers actively creating, modifying 
and collaborating on content online by making them important message-distribution channel 
members, leading to great reach potential (Coyle ​et al.​, 2011). Often, such online consumer 
activity revolves around brands. A total of 70 percent of consumers have turned to social media 
properties for information about a product, brand or company, with 49 percent of these 
consumers using the information they gather to make a purchase (DEI Worldwide, 2008). 
Counter to conventional wisdom, the vast majority of people have moderate-sized social 
networks and are just as willing to share marketing messages with others as the highly 
connected are willing to share (Smith ​et al.​, 2007). In general, the impact of those assumed to 
be most influential may be overstated (Watts and Dodds, 2007). 
Not surprisingly, online information seekers claim that product and service information provided 
by other consumers through social media sites is more valuable than when this information is 
provided by marketers (Greene, 2009). Consumers are adept at differentiating between expert 
and consumer recommendations online, and they perceive consumer recommendations as 
more trustworthy than those of experts (Huang and Chen, 2006). This preference for 
recommendations from friends over recommendations from experts is particularly strong among 
female consumers (Garbarino and Strahilevitz, 2004), and is true both online and offline 
(Strahilevitz, 2007). Prior WOM research has found source credibility to be a predictor of sharing 
 
information (Richins and Root-Shaffer, 1988), and source credibility is considered a potentially 
influential factor in sharing information online (Ho and Dempsey, 2010). 
One particular source of online information that has been studied is market mavens, who are 
sources of information about the marketplace in general (Clark and Goldsmith, 2005; Feick and 
Price, 1987). The need to help others by providing marketplace information can also be seen in 
work looking at consumers’ motivations for expressing their opinions in online consumer opinion 
platforms (e.g. epinions.com), in which four primary factors emerged: consumers’ desire for 
social interaction, their desire for economic incentives, their concern for other consumers, and 
the potential to enhance their self-worth (Hennig-Thurau ​et al.​, 2004). Most recently, altruism 
was found to be positively related to sharing online information, in general, (Ho and Dempsey, 
2010) though not online advertising specifically. 
Acknowledging these new roles of electronic WOM, researchers are studying the effects of 
more impersonal WOM such as chat rooms and recommendation sites, message boards, 
reputation systems and online user-generated product reviews. Not surprisingly, Mayzlin (2006) 
found that promotional chat generated from sources such as online product rating systems 
benefited firms with products that are considered superior. Liu (2006) studied the use of online 
message boards for movies and found that WOM volume before a movie’s release is more 
important than after its release. It has been found, again not surprisingly, that user 
recommendations and star rankings in online reviews influence the sales of books (Chevalier 
and Mayzlin, 2006). 
Lastly, researchers have considered product innovativeness (Sun ​et al.​, 2006), how often 
consumers expect to buy the product, how much money is spent to support the viral campaign 
(Neff, 2007), and consumer innovativeness (Shoham and Ruvio, 2008) as influencers of online 
WOM marketing. 
Prior research on electronic referrals  
Studies of ereferral incentives are few. In general, rewarding existing customers increases 
WOM (Wirtz and Chew, 2002) and ereferral likelihood, and financial rewards are especially 
effective in increasing ereferral to weak ties and for weaker brands (Ryu and Feick, 2007). In 
their analytic model of ereferrals, Biyalogorsky ​et al.​ (2001) find that ereferral strategies are 
especially effective when customers are either not very demanding or are moderately 
demanding. Perceptions of the source of the ereferral Electronic word of mouth 1037 may play a 
role in ereferral receptiveness as well. In a study of willingness to switch German energy 
providers, perceptions of ereferral source expertise and similarity influenced ereferral receiver 
behavior (Wangenheim and Bayon, 2004). 
 
Prior research on equity and incentives 
When incentives to both senders and receivers are a component of ereferral activity, 
equity theory may explain the decision-making activity of the two parties. Intuitively 
we may think that the person making a recommendation cares only about what 
incentive is offered to him and not the receiving party, however equity theory suggests 
otherwise. In general, equity theory can be described as the proposition that  
individuals seek equity in what they give and what they receive (Walster ​et al.​, 1973). 
So the sender may believe that the receiver should also receive an incentive for efforts 
made. Equity exists when both parties receive the same incentive, such as $5 for the 
sender and $5 for the receiver. Inequity is present when the incentive levels to the two 
parties are of different magnitudes. When the sender receives $10 and the receiver gets 
$5, there is positive inequity for the sender. When the sender receives $5 and the 
receiver gets $10, there is negative inequity for the sender. 
 
A person’s perception of the equity in a relationship may be altered depending on the 
assessment of the value and relevance of other participants’ inputs and outcomes (Walster ​et 
al.​, 1973). In ereferral situations, the input is the amount of effort required to take action by the 
sender or the receiver. Senders’ inputs can be described as the ereferral attempts that they 
make in telling others about a product or service. Receivers’ inputs can be thought of as a 
successful referral – the purchase of the referred product or service or the registration on a 
website. The outcome is the financial incentive provided to the sender or the receiver or utility of 
the product for the receiver. An example is when the sender receives $10 and the receiver 
receives $5. It is expected, then, that positive inequity for the sender will result in better ereferral 
attempts than negative inequity for the sender. 
 
Inequity may be present when the perceived inputs of one person are in opposition to what that 
person perceives are the inputs of another person (Adams, 1963). When a significant level of 
inequity exists between two parties, then both participants are likely to feel inequity distress. For 
a person receiving a larger financial incentive in an ereferral situation, inequity distress could 
take the form of guilt, or harm to one’s sense of being a good and fair person. Most people 
accept the ethical principle of fairness and equitable dealings with others (Walster ​et al.​, 1973). 
 
Hypotheses regarding incentive magnitude  
The relationship between incentive size and ereferral success  
 
The field of economics is based on the notion that people are utility maximizers who make 
decisions in their own self-interest. While the entire field of behavioral economics has shown 
 
endless exceptions to this (Ariely, 2010, and (Levitt and Dubner, 2005), it is still assumed that 
people will be more motivated to do something if you offer them a larger reward for doing so. 
 
As mentioned previously, to prompt ereferrals, a financial incentive can be used. Such an 
incentive could be offered to the sender and/or the receiver. Larger incentives should be more 
powerful motivators than smaller ones. We would expect this to hold for both senders and 
receivers. Thus:  
 
H1a​. Larger individual incentives for senders of ereferrals will lead to more ereferrals 
being made.  
H1b​. Larger individual incentives to receivers of ereferrals will lead to a higher 
response rate to ereferrals, and thus more new customers registering.  
H1c​. Larger individual incentives to receivers of ereferrals will lead to a higher 
response rate to ereferrals, and thus more new customers registering who become 
buyers. 
 
Hypotheses regarding incentive equity  
Financial incentive offers may be unequal to the two parties, such as $10 to the sender and $5 
to the receiver, or vice versa. They can also be equitable with both parties receiving the same 
amount. ​H1a-H1c​ suggest that overall ereferral activity, in the form of more suggested referrals 
as well as results, should increase as each party’s individual utility of engaging in it increases. 
However, not all motivations are so selfish. Some referrers may be more willing to pass 
something on to a friend or family member if they think it will be of value to that person. Thus, 
since larger total financial incentives are likely to motivate both the sender and the receiver 
more than smaller incentives, we expect the following:  
 
H2a​. The larger the total financial reward offered to the sender and receiver, the higher 
the number of ereferrals will be sent.  
H2b​. The larger the total financial reward offered to the sender and receiver, the higher 
the total number of people register.  
H2c​. The larger the total financial reward offered to the sender and receiver, the higher 
the total number of people who register and become buyers. 
 
H2a-H2c​ addressed ereferral results for financial incentives when combining the incentives of 
both the sender and receiver. When ereferral results are deconstructed into the sender’s 
behavior (ereferral attempts) and the receiver’s behavior (ereferral conversions of new 
registrants and then new buyers), then it is anticipated that varying the incentive levels will affect 
those independent actions.  
 
 
Inequity distress could lead participants to act differently than they would in an equitable 
scenario. For ereferrals, consider a scenario that may be affected by inequity distress. In this 
scenario, the offer combination to the two parties is equal versus a considerably higher incentive 
to the sender. We have assumed that only senders are aware of both parties’ incentives. An 
example of this is when the offer combination to the two parties is equal, such as $10 to both 
the sender and to receiver compared to an offer combination of $20 to the sender and $0 to the 
receiver. 
 
On the sender’s side, for example, when a financial incentive offer is an unequal combination of 
$10 to the sender and $5 to the receiver, more ereferral attempts resulting in increased 
ereferrals are expected to result. Thus: 
 
H3​. In unequal financial incentive offer ereferral situations, those with the sender 
receiving a higher financial offer than the receiver will yield more ereferral attempts by 




This study focused on a large-scale field experiment that was conducted with members 
of an online shopping mall, Ebates. Ebates provides “cash back” for shopping through 
its website at more than 1,000 popular online retailers. For example, a member can 
shop through Ebates at Apple, 1-800-Flowers, or the Gap and receive a percentage of 
cash back from the purchase. Cash back percentages range from 1 to 25 percent of the 
sale, and average approximately 3 percent. The cash back accumulates quarterly and 
then Ebates sends the member a hard copy check or deposits the money directly into 
an online banking account such as PayPal. 
 
The process of becoming an Ebates customer involves two steps. The first step is to 
register minimal contact information including name and e-mail address. Once a 
consumer has completed this step, he/she is now considered a member. The second 
step is to actually purchase through Ebates, which then begins the accumulation of 
cash back. Once a member has completed the first purchase, he/she is now considered a 
buyer. 
 
This two-step process makes Ebates an attractive site for ereferral research. The 
first step mirrors the membership process required by many online non-commerce sites 
including content and social networking sites. The second step reflects the purchase 
process similar to that of most online ecommerce sites. 
 
Participants were randomly assigned from Ebates’ millions of buyers who had 
purchased within a 12-month period and had not opted-out of e-mail communication 
from the company. The criteria for selection into the experiment included the following: 
 
 
● Random assignment was used to assign participants to each condition, so there was no 
bias in who ended up in which experimental group. 
● The customers included had all purchased within the last 12 months. This helped 
confirm validity of the customer’s current contact information including the e-mail 
address, which was required for the experiment. 
● The customers recruited for this study did not include any who had opted-out of e-mail 
communications from Ebates. Excluding customers who had opted-out of contact 
ensured that Ebates adhered to its commitment not to spam its customers with 
unwanted communication. 
 
There were 45,000 Ebates buyers who were sent prospecting e-mails in this 
between-subjects experiment. Of those 45,000 prospecting e-mails sent, 37,601 were 
actually delivered as measured by Ebates’ e-mail software system. Undeliverable 
e-mails may have occurred due to bad e-mail addresses, a recipient’s change of e-mail 
address, internet service provider address changes and other issues. 
 
Two independent variables regarding incentives were designed and then randomly 
assigned to one of eight conditions in a two-factor between-subject design. The two 
factors were: 
(1) Incentive magnitudes to senders of $5, $10, $25, or $50. 
(2) Incentive magnitudes to receivers of $5, $10, $25, or $50. 
 
The incentive magnitudes varied from $5 to $50 including matching incentive levels 
for the sender and receiver, larger incentives to the senders, and larger incentives to the 
receivers, depending on the condition to which participants were randomly assigned. 
 
There were three dependent variables: 
(1) The number of ereferral invitation e-mails sent from current members (senders) 
to prospective members (receivers). 
(2) The number of Ebates new members acquired through the ereferral efforts. 
(3) The number of those new members that converted to become new buyers. 
 
The ereferral process began by Ebates contacting the current Ebates member (sender) 
through a prospecting e-mail with one of eight financial incentive combination offers 
(see Figure 1). The sender then chose whether or not to make an ereferral attempt with 
a friend, family member, acquaintance or other person (receiver). Senders could have 
made a single ereferral attempt, multiple attempts to one receiver, single attempts to 
multiple receivers, or multiple attempts to multiple receivers. If successful, the receiver 
registered contact information with Ebates and thus became a new member. For both 
parties to earn the financial incentive offered, the new member must have made a 
purchase within the ereferral offer expiration period of three weeks. Once this step 
occurred, the new member’s status changed to that of a new buyer. 
 
 
Ebates’ technology systems tracked all of the ereferral prospecting e-mails sent as 
well as the overall ereferral results. In the prospecting e-mail sent to the sender, the 
sender clicked on a URL to link to an Ebates’ landing page on which he/she entered the 
receiver’s contact information. An example of the first paragraph in the control e-mail 
message offering $5 to the sender and $5 to the receiver is shown here: 
 
Invite your friends ​to save with Ebates and for every friend who signs up and makes a qualifying 
purchase, we will add ​$5 * Cash Back​ to your Ebates account, and ​$5 * to your friend’s​! But hurry 




Field experiment process – depicts communication steps in ereferral process from solicitation through 
conversion 
 
An example of the first paragraph in the e-mail message that increased the sender’s 
offer to $10 and held constant the $5 receiver offer is shown here. Except for the 
manipulated variables, the messaging was similar across conditions. 
 
Invite your friends​ to save with Ebates and for every friend who signs up and makes a 
qualifying purchase, we will add ​$10 * Cash Back ​to your Ebates account, and ​$5 * to your 
friend’s​! But hurry – you only have until Month Day, Year to receive this special Cash Back offer! 
 
 
Once a sender provided the receiver’s contact information on Ebates referral website 
page, an invitation e-mail was then automatically generated by Ebates and sent to the 
receiver. This invitation e-mail referenced the sender’s name and was able to be 
customized by the sender, but also allowed a default e-mail to be generated. All e-mails 
sent from the sender’s Ebates account were tracked and measured. The Ebates’ 
invitation e-mails sent to the receivers provided a unique URL for receivers to link to an 
Ebates’ welcome and introductory page that encouraged membership. The URL 
“followed” the receiver through the process until he/she became a new member and 
then later if he/she became a new buyer. 
 
Participants received one set of offer combinations ($X for the sender and $Y for the 
receiver). However, only the sender was aware of both financial offers for the two 
parties. The receivers had exposure to their own incentives only (unless the senders 
independently decided to communicate with the receivers about both incentives). For 
both parties to earn the financial incentive offered, new buyer purchases must have 
been made within 3 weeks. No minimum purchase through Ebates was required. 
Therefore a new buyer could have earned a $5-$50 incentive on a purchase as low as a 
few dollars or as much as thousands of dollars. The process used in the field 
experiment, described above, is depicted here in Figure 1. 
 
We tested combinations of these variables. An example of a treatment condition is 
one that offered $10 to the sender and $5 to the receiver, while another condition 
reversed that for $5 to the sender and $10 to the receiver. Financial incentive offers 
were manipulated and included one of eight offer combinations ($ for sender / $ for 
receiver): $5/$5, $5/$10, $5/$25, $5/$50, $10/$5, $25/$5, $50/$5, and $25/$25. 
 
Field experiment results 
A summary of results from the field experiment is presented in Table I, then described 
further in the following section. 
 
H1 ​results 
H1 ​was tested by comparing the two groups where equal incentives were offered to the 
sender and receiver. Specifically, these two conditions were $5/$5 and $25/$25. Of the 
12,000 e-mails sent from these two conditions, 10,077 were successfully delivered. 
Undeliverable e-mails may have occurred due to variety of reasons including incorrect 
e-mail addresses being provided, a change in a recipients e-mail address, or a full 
Inbox. 
 
As expected, in ereferral situations where both the sender and receiver are offered 
equal financial incentives, the higher the incentive, the more ereferral results were 
observed (see Table I). As the incentive to senders and receivers was increased from $5 
each to $25 each, all three of the dependent variables were positively and significantly 
 
affected and thus the hypothesis was supported. The percent of invitation e-mails sent 
increased significantly from 4.01 percent to 10.04 percent (​F​(1,661) = 19.9630, 
p​ < 0.0000. This measure observes the action of the sender mainly because it is the 
sender’s effort that is required to invite friends via the company website, which sends 
out the ereferral e-mails after the sender provides the friend’s name and e-mail address. 
The second and third dependent variables are measures of activity by the receiver of 
the ereferral, as opposed to measures of sender activity. The increase in ereferral 
results in both of these measures was also significant. The rate of new members 
increased from 1.43 percent to 4.43 percent per thousand (​F​(1,264) = 17.3800, 
p​ < 0.0000). The rate of ​new buyers​ increased from 0.83 percent to 2.37 percent 







$ receiver n 






































































Note​: Results shown are for prospecting e-mails delivered by the company to its current members, for 
example, which resulted in 4.01 percent invitation, e-mails sent, 1.43 percent new members and 0.83 
percent new buyers by purchasing within the three-week offer expiration period 
 
Table I.​ Results of the field experiment – ​H1 ​and ​H3 
 
H2 ​results 
H2 ​was tested by comparing the groups with unequal offer combinations of $5/$10 and 
$10/$5, $5/$25 and $25/$5, $5/$50 and $50/$5 (unequal incentives to the sender and 
receiver. There were a total of 33,000 e-mails sent to six offer incentive groups that 
tested this hypothesis. Of these 33,000 e-mails sent, 27,524 were deliverable, and thus 
able to be opened by the recipient. 
 
It was anticipated that in unequal financial offer ereferral situations, higher total 
offer combinations would result in increased ereferral results in all three dependent 
measures of invitation e-mails sent, new members and new buyers. ​H2 ​differed from 




As expected, in ereferral situations where both the sender and receiver are offered 
unequal financial incentives, the higher the total incentive, the more ereferral results 
were observed (see Table II). As the combined incentive to senders and receivers was 
increased from $15 ($10/$5 and $5/$10) to $30 ($25/$5 and $5/$25) and then to $55 
($50/$5 and $5/$50), the rate of invitation e-mails sent increased significantly from 1.23 
percent to 5.95 percent to 7.13 percent (​F​(1,1565) = 8.1726, ​p​ < 0.01). The second and 
third dependent variables are measures of activity by the receiver of the ereferral as 
opposed to measures of sender activity. The increase in ereferral results in both of 
these measures was also significant. The rate of new members increased from 1.80 
percent to 1.84 percent to 2.60 percent (​F​(1,546) = 3.8586, ​p​ < 0.05). The rate of new 
buyers increased from 0.79 percent to 0.91 percent to 1.30 percent (​F​(1,260) = 4.4287, 
p​ < 0.05). Thus, ​H2a-H2c​ were supported. 
 
H3 ​results 
This hypothesis predicted that in unequal financial incentive offer ereferral situations, 
those with the sender receiving a higher financial offer than the receiver will yield a 
higher number of ereferral attempts (results for the number of invitation e-mails sent) 
than when the ereferral receiver’s incentive is higher. There were 33,000 subjects 
included in this aspect of the field experiment and there were three planned contrasts 
analyzed. The first was $10/$5 and $5/$10. Of the 14,000 prospecting e-mails sent to 
participants in these two groups, 11,622 were delivered. The second planned contrast 
compared the offer combinations of $25/$5 and $5/$25 which had a total of 12,000 
prospecting e-mails sent and 9,971 delivered. The third group was the offer 
combination of $50/$5 and $5/$50 which had a total of 7,000 prospecting e-mails sent 
and 5,931 delivered. See Table I. 
 
Comparisons were run using a ​t​-test. In the $5/$10 and $10/$5 contrast, the number 
of ​invitation e-mails ​sent decreased slightly from 4.82 percent to 4.63 percent although 
the results were not significant (​p​ = 0.813). The results from this group did not support 
the hypothesis. However, as the disparity between offer incentives increased, the 
results became significant and did support the hypothesis. In the $5/$25 and $25/$5 
contrast, invitation e-mails sent increased from 4.76 percent to 7.61 percent (​p​ < 0.05). 
And, in the third contrast of $5/$50 and $50/$5, the number of invitation e-mails sent 
increased from 4.86 percent to 12.73 percent (​p​ < 0.000). Overall, then, ​H3 ​was supported. 
 
Discussion/managerial implications 
The results of the field experiment supported some hypotheses yet led to some 
surprises as well. As expected, in ​H1​, the higher the incentives of equal value that were 
 
offered to both parties, the more ereferral results were observed. This validates the 
previous findings by Anderson (1998) that ereferral activity should increase as the 
utility of engaging in it increases. In the field experiment there were two conditions 
used in this hypothesis – those with a $5/$5 and a $25/$25 offer. The disparity between 
these two sets of offers is large (five times higher), and therefore it is not surprising that 
all three dependent variables of invitation e-mails, new members and new buyers 
experienced significant increases. It would be interesting to understand the effects as 
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Table II.​ Results of the field experiment – ​H2 
 
In ​H2​, the offer incentives were unequal between the sender and receiver and 
applied three sets of conditions: $10/$5 and $5/$10 ($15 total), $25/$5 and $5/$25 ($30 
total), $50/$5 and $5/$50 ($55 total). Using all three sets with varying degrees of 
disparity allowed a view into the importance of the size of the offer incentive. In all 
three sets of conditions, all three of the dependent variables (invitation e-mails, new 
members and new buyers) showed significant increase between the combined 
incentive levels. The results from this hypothesis provide additional insights beyond 
what ​H1 ​offered – that seemingly regardless of the individual incentives to the sender 
and receiver, as the total-but-unequal combined offer incentives increased, so did all 
dependent measures. 
 
Unlike ​H1​, in which there were only two groups to compare, the three groups in the 
H2 ​data allow us to understand the variable effect of the increase in incentive offers, as 
depicted in Figure 2. The most dramatic increase in the slope of the ereferral results is 
seen in the ereferral invitation e-mails sent group, that one which is driven by the 
sender’s behavior. As the offer incentives increase (x-axis), the sender’s response 
( y-axis, line with triangles) is more dramatically affected by higher incentives. 
 
We can speculate reasons for this. One reason may be that the offer to the sender that 
is higher (e.g. $50/$5) is driving the results the most, as opposed to offers in which the 
sender’s offer is lower (e.g. $5/$50). Another reason may be that the receiver’s behavior is 
 
more driven by the interest in the product or service and its relevance, rather than the 
incentive for the service. So a conclusion could be that receiver behavior does not change 
as much as the sender’s behavior changes when incentives are manipulated. 
 
However, it seems hard to believe that the unequal incentives, especially those at the 
higher levels, had no individual effect on the ereferral results. Thus, the second 
hypothesis was used to analyze sender behavior separately from receiver behavior. 
 
At its most basic level, ​H2 ​proposes that senders act in their own best interests. 
Therefore, in the ereferral activity that the senders control – the invitation e-mails – 
the prediction was that as the senders’ incentives increased, so would the quantity of 
invitation e-mails sent. 
 
In ​H3​, the hypothesis was supported at the two higher incentive levels of $25/$5 and 
$5/$25, and $50/$5 and $5/$50, but not at the lower incentive combination of $10/$5 and 
$5/$10. Therefore, as the incentive reached a level that apparently interested 
participants ($25 and $50, but not at $10), senders increased their efforts and sent out 
significantly more invitation e-mails. At the $10 level, senders sent 46.3 per thousand 
invitation e-mails. By increasing the incentive from $10 to $25 (150 percent incentive 
increase) the rate of invitation e-mails sent increased to 76.1 per thousand (64 percent 
results increase). And, by increasing the incentive from $25 to $50 (100 percent 
incentive increase) the rate of invitation e-mails sent increased to 127.3 per thousand 
(67 percent results increase). So while the ereferral results for the sender increased 
significantly between incentive levels, the payoff for the firm does not track at the same rate. 
 
 
Figure 2.​ Graph of ​H2 ​results 
 
Interestingly, the rate of invitation e-mails initiated by senders was observed to be a 
 
near dead heat at all incentive levels when the sender incentive was held constant at $5. 
 
Although no hypothesis was created for this observation, it is fascinating to note 
that the sender’s actions did not change at the $5 sender incentive level regardless of 
the receiver’s incentive. Combining this information with that of the predicted ​H2a 
hypothesis then, it can be concluded fairly strongly that the sender acts almost purely 
in his own best interest and alters behavior according to his own incentive only when 
his incentive is lower. 
 
The applications of these findings by the practitioner may be accomplished in many 
ways and would depend on the incentive and referral model. Providing larger 
incentives overall, appears to motivate the sender to act more. Therefore a manager 
should test varying levels of incentives to senders at levels appropriate for their 
business models. There will be a point at which the increased incentive will have 
diminishing returns for the business as well as reactions by competitors. This can best 
be determined based on the combination of the business model, its product, the net 
revenue and then incentive levels. 
 
Regarding the dual incentives to senders and receivers, the practitioner should 
“spend” more on the sender than on the receiver. It is the sender who will be 
communicating for the business as a mini sales force, of sorts. Our experiment proved 
that providing a larger incentive for the sender than for the receiver maximizes results. 
However, when the incentive disparity is too large, results began to decrease. Therefore 
a manager should not create such a large inequity that it makes the sender 
uncomfortable. 
 
In our field experiment, the product (cash back by shopping at your favorite stores 
online) has general appeal. Receiving a rebate is appealing to most people. Incentivized 
customers who refer new business can be viewed as a type of sales force. The marketer 
“pays his sales force” when he rewards them for referring new business. Our results 
suggest that rewarding senders of ereferrals may be more effective than increasing 
rewards to new customers. 
 
Limitations and future research 
This study had the advantage of measuring actual consumer behavior in a real-world 
context. However, it was limited to a degree by the inability to analyze equity on the 
receiver side of the sender/receiver equation. The Ebates’ ereferral invitation 
methodology allowed the sender to have exposure to both the sender and receiver 
incentives and therefore equity could be observed by the sender of the ereferral. 
However, the receiver did not see the sender’s incentive and therefore was unaware of 
 
any positive or negative inequity for the ereferral. Thus, an important area for future 
research would involve studying both sender and receiver responses when the receiver 
is also aware of both parties offer incentives. 
 
Many extensions of this research hold appeal and interest. Regarding the 
application of incentives to ereferrals, exploring conditions without incentives, or with 
nonmonetary incentives would broaden our understanding of incentives and ereferral 
behavior. For example, incentives could take the form of donations to charity or being 
entered in a lottery. While donations to charity appeal to a very different set of values 
from receiving money for oneself, research suggests that small donations can be a 
powerful motivator (Dunn ​et al.​, 2008, Strahilevitz, 2010). Due to the results suggesting 
that the sender’s incentive, as opposed to the receiver’s incentive, is more impactful on 
ereferral results, future research can include offering rewards to only the senders or to 
neither party. 
 
There are other possibilities to extend this research. One area would be to 
understand the effect of demographics on ereferral behavior. It is likely that gender 
influences ereferral behavior as prior work has found women to be more easily 
influenced by WOM (Garbarino and Strahilevitz, 2004) as well as more likely to spread 
WOM (Strahilevitz, 2007). Other demographic aspects such as culture, age, family 
status and nationality may also be influential in ereferral behavior. For example, it is 
possible that in countries with more equitable policies regarding wealth distribution 
that equity will play a larger role and that inequity will have a stronger negative effect. 
 
In addition to studying incentives and their effect on ereferrals, exploring “how” 
ereferrals are made is of interest. The ereferral mechanism used in this research was 
what Ebates was using at the time. After receiving an e-mail from the company, the 
sender clicks a link in the e-mail and lands on the company’s ereferral page. The sender 
then provides the name and e-mail addresses of receivers after which the company 
sends invitation e-mails. This process presents at least two obstacles. First, the lack of 
ease of this methodology could limit ereferrals. Second, because senders are providing 
contact information of friends and family, the senders could have concerns of privacy 
for their friends – they do not want them to be spammed by the company or have the 
e-mail addresses sold to third parties. Introducing new ereferral mechanisms that 
overcome these hurdles could impact ereferral behavior. For example, we could look at 
a scenario where the company asks the sender to forward the prospecting e-mail to 
family and friends. This would eliminate both constraints mentioned above of time and 
privacy because forwarding an e-mail takes only a couple of seconds and also keeps it 
private by not providing e-mail addresses to the firm. 
 
Another ereferral mechanism we could examine would be asking senders to post 
invitations to social networking sites. This could increase the size of the network from 
just family and friends to that of the often far wider membership and connections on 
 
social networking sites. An interesting aspect to this ereferral mechanism is the 
evolution of a “known” network of family and friends to an “unknown” network and 
the effect that may have on the equity and inequity of incentives. Since many reviews 
are posted anonymously on message boards, there is the question of the relative 
potency of referrals from people one knows to referrals from people one has never met. 
One might expect equity to play a stronger role when friends, family and colleagues are 
involved than when strangers are involved. 
 
Finally, we acknowledge that the long-term value of the newly acquired members 
and customers is of utmost importance to the practitioner. Therefore, a longitudinal 
study may be considered for studying the effects of the varying incentive levels and 
their contribution to loyalty. 
Summary and conclusion 
We began this research interested in learning more about the effect of incentives on 
ereferral behavior of both senders and receivers. We created a study that varied 
incentive levels to both parties to examine how incentive size and equity of incentives 
to both parties affects actual ereferral behavior. 
 
The study was a large-scale field experiment with 45,000 participants. E-mails were 
sent to participants asking them to refer family and friends. Financial incentives were 
offered to both the sender and the receiver. Incentive levels varied from $5 to $50 with a 
total of eight conditions. The three dependent variables (number of invitation e-mails 
sent, number of new members, and number of new buyers) provided an opportunity to 
understand ereferral behavior of both senders and receivers. We were able to track the 
number of new buyers generated within each condition as well, but also the mediating 
behaviors leading to this, which include both the number of invitations sent by 
members and the number of referrals that lead to becoming a member, which is 
required in order to make a purchase. 
 
We believe that the research findings offer unique insights into equity theory 
between individuals as well as offer implications for managers. Overall it was observed 
that as the size of incentives increase, ereferral results also increase. This result is not 
surprising, because as people are offered a higher incentive, it seems logical that they 
will take more action as either a sender or receiver. And it seems that equity theory has 
little predictive value in this context. 
 
However, our research suggests that offering more affects the sender’s response 
more than offering the receiver more. This suggests that offering a sender more may 
“pay off” for a firm. Additionally, it seems that a sender is willing and interested in 
receiving a higher offer than the receiver, but not too much higher. This suggests that 
 
if positive inequity is excessive, it may become emotionally unpleasant to act upon. 
Thus, it appears that a sender’s ereferral attempts have a breaking point at which 
greater positive inequity, favoring the sender, is no longer motivating. 
 
From a managerial viewpoint, a firm can consider its current members to be its 
mini-sales force. By allocating its referral budget between the senders (sales force) and 
receivers (potential new customers), the firm can maximize their results. The results of 
the research presented here offer initial guidelines for marketers interested in customer 
acquisition via ereferrals that use incentives. The discussion and suggestions for future 
research open doors to researchers interested in further pursuing this topic. 
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